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ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
Mr. Pack objects to the Cabinet Shoppe's attempt to recharacterize the issues 
and to its misstatements of review standards. The Cabinet Shoppe manufactures 
issues which do not exist and are in fact "non-issues". The Cabinet Shoppe 
attempts to alter the scope and purpose of this appeal by creating issues of fact, and 
diverting the court's attention away from the legal issues at hand. It is the 
prerogative of the Appellant to frame the issues presented for review and the scope 
of the questions presented. Yee v. City of Escondido. 112S.Ct. 1522, 1532 
(1992). Notwithstanding the fact that the issues presented by Mr. Pack are legal, 
the factual claims made by the Cabinet Shoppe are not supported by evidence or 
even pertinent to the true issues. Therefore Appellant's Reply Brief will address 
the factual issues raised by Appellee and illustrate how the facts relied upon by the 
Cabinet Shoppe are not based on substantial evidence. Mr. Pack's issues, 
originally set forth in Appellant's Brief are restated as follows: 
The accepted provisions of both parties' documents (PI. Exhs. 1 and 3) 
comprise the parties' entire contract, as agreed by them. The Cabinet Shoppe's 
preprinted standard form did not supersede the contract terms prepared by Mr. 
Pack. This is an issue of law, not a factual dispute and this court should apply the 
terms of both contracts and not defer to the trial court's legal conclusion, even 
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though that conclusion may be denominated as a "factual" finding. Buehner Block 
Co. v. UWC Assoc. 752 P.2d 892 (Utah 1988). 
Whether or not the withholding of payment, when the Cabinet Shoppe had 
failed to complete or repair its work, constituted a breach of the terms of the two-
document contract is an issue of law. This court will give no deference to the trial 
court's decision thereon. 
The Cabinet Shoppe claims that the central issue presented for review is 
whether there exists in the record any evidence to support the trial court's findings 
of fact and that Appellant must marshal the evidence supporting the findings, and 
demonstrate that it is insufficient. Mr. Pack's issues presented for reviev/ are ones 
of law, not of fact and while it is a true statement that the Appellant must marshal 
all evidence, the foregoing standard is not the standard of review for the issues 
presented by Mr. Pack. 
The trial court's allowance and consideration of the testimony of Ms. Luanda 
Lewis, in clear violation of the exclusion rule, is reviewed under a correctness 
standard, State v. Ramirez. 817 P.2d 774, 781 n. 3 (Utah 1991). The standard of 
review is not mere "abuse of discretion". 
Also, an award of reasonable attorney fees rests within the sound discretion of 
the trial court but must be supported by adequate findings and evidence in the 
record. Dixie State Bank v. Bracken. 764 P.2d 985, 988 (Utah 1988). 
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In its second issue, the Cabinet Shoppe claims the trial court exercised 
discretion to permit Ms. Luanda Lewis to testify after she was present during Mr. 
Pack's testimony. The standard of review stated by the Cabinet Shoppe, abuse of 
discretion with clear or manifest prejudice, is erroneous. "Whether a piece of 
evidence is admissible is a question of law and [the court] must always review 
questions of law under a correctness standard." State v. Ramirez, 817 P.2d 774 
(Utah 1991), Scharff v. BMG Corporation. 700 P.2d 1068, 1070 (Utah 1985). The 
issue is not one of weight of testimony or demeanor of the witness but rather 
whether the witness could even testify in the first instance. 
The issues raised on this appeal are legal issues, not factual challenges based 
upon an insufficiency of evidence. The evidence relevant to the legal issues raised 
on appeal has been marshalled objectively and fairly. The Cabinet Shoppe wishes 
to "reframe" the issues as factual because they would have this appeal be something 
other than what it is. 
We submit that Mr. Pack has properly framed the issues in this appeal for this 
court's review. This court should not be dissuaded from the legitimate legal issues 
by the Cabinet Shoppe's factual "non-issues". 
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STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Mr. Pack refers this court to Appellant's Statement of Facts set forth in 
Appellant's Brief. The Cabinet Shoppe's Statement of Facts, however, while 
purporting to marshal the evidence, persists in belaboring facts completely 
irrelevant to the issues in this appeal. Appellant cannot address each and every 
statement but presents a few telling examples. 
Appellant's main issue, whether or not both of the parties' documents should 
constitute the terms of the contract, is neither supported nor weakened by the 
evidence cited by the Cabinet Shoppe. For instance, the fact that Mr, Pack 
contracted for the cabinets at a lower price than the price first quoted by the 
Cabinet Shoppe has nothing to do with the intent of both parties to use both 
documents to make up the terms of their final contract. 
The evidence argued by the Cabinet Shoppe (at pages 2 and 3 of Appellee's 
Brief) are not relevant to the legal issues presented by Mr. Pack on appeal. 
Moreover, several of Appellee's statements are misleading. The court made no 
"finding" that "even under Mr. Pack's theory of the case" Mr. Pack refused to 
cooperate in order for the Cabinet Shoppe to complete repair. The Cabinet 
Shoppe's contention that the writing "takes exception" by Mr. Pack in the Cabinet 
Shoppe's contract (PI. Exh. 3) did not eliminate these terms from the parties' 
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agreement, is not a factual finding by the court but is a conclusion of law contrary 
to the authority discussed in Appellant's Brief. 
Statement of Fact No. 3 in the Appellee's Brief again neither supports nor 
undermines the issue here. In fact, Appellee fails to state all of the facts. 
Specifically, the Appellee's preprinted contract form not only states: "any claim 
for adjustment shall not be reason or cause for failure to make payment arising 
from or under this contract . . .", said contract also states that "the Seller agrees 
that it will perform this contract in conformity with customary industry practices." 
(PI. Exh. 3) 
The Cabinet Shoppe's Statement No. 4.a. through 4.e. likewise does not 
address the issues on appeal. Any "extras" done by the Cabinet Shoppe are not at 
issue here. The installation of a replacement rangehood, the letter slot cabinet, the 
rebuilt kitchen island and the oak backsplash, allegedly constructed "at no extra 
cost" to Mr. Pack are not in dispute. However, while the Cabinet Shoppe may 
have completed to Mr. Pack's satisfaction many features in the house, the issues 
upon which we must focus here are those products contracted for but not received. 
Appellee relies throughout its Brief on Defendant's Exhibit No. 6, a self-
serving letter written by Ms. Lewis to Mr. Pack. Her letter discusses the repairs 
done for Mr. Pack, but, for the most part, fails to address what the Cabinet Shoppe 
failed to complete. The Cabinet Shoppe's argument is similar to a car dealer who 
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sells a customer a car with no engine. When the customer complains, the seller 
then graciously gives the buyer another set of keys. The buyer does not have to be 
satisfied with two keys for a car that has no engine and will not run. That is not 
what the buyer purchased. The "extras" provided to Mr. Pack from the Cabinet 
Shoppe are nice and were necessary to meet the Cabinet Shoppe's obligations under 
the contract. However, they do not excuse the nonperformance of other products. 
Furthermore, Mr. Pack never agreed to make the final payment to the Cabinet 
Shoppe when Mark Sellers and Gary Lewis came to the Pack home on November 
2, 1988 and no evidence in support of such a contention was ever offered at trial. 
The purpose of Mr. Sellers and Mr. Lewis returning to the Pack home was to 
inspect, and correct problems, which they refused to do after threatening Mr. 
Pack's father. (Tr. 27, 176) 
According to Paragraph No. 6 of the Cabinet Shoppe's Statement of Facts, it is 
clear that Ms. Lewis was indeed influenced by the testimony she heard and 
observed prior to her own. Plaintiffs Exhibits 6 and 8 are letters containing 
specifics of the finalized contract and terms of the parties. After hearing Plaintiff 
explain his letters (Tr. 12-22), Ms. Lewis was able to deny that she ever received 
the letters. And, the Cabinet Shoppe's boast that it used only "high standard 
quality materials" is not at issue in this appeal. The character and quality of 
defendant's workmanship and installation at this home are the issues. 
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
1. The court's "finding", really a legal conclusion, that Mr. Pack's contract 
is superseded by the Cabinet Shoppe contract was not based on substantial 
competent evidence. Both parties' adopted and considered both documents as their 
contract. Mr Pack objected to certain terms of the Cabinet Shoppe contract and 
clearly set forth such objections by writing "takes exception" next to the rejected 
paragraphs. The Cabinet Shoppe never objected to Mr. Pack's rejections. The 
court's finding that the Cabinet Shoppe contract applies in its entirety is, in fact, an 
erroneous legal conclusion not based on the evidence. 
2. To the extent it is relevant here, the trial court's finding that Mr. Pack 
failed to allow any repairs to the cabinets is a grievous misinterpretation of the facts 
and is "clearly erroneous". The Cabinet Shoppe had Mr. Pack's full cooperation. 
Except for a single incident in which Mr. Lewis was asked not to return, the other 
Cabinet Shoppe employee, Mr. Sellers, who had done all of the prior work was 
always welcome. In fact, Mr. Pack requested several times after the November 2 
incident that Mr. Sellers return to do repairs and Mr. Sellers returned to the Pack 
home at least once, but failed to make the necessary repairs. 
3. The third point which has been addressed in both briefs, although 
phrased quite differently, is the failure of the Cabinet Shoppe to provide cabinets 
conforming to the high standard required by the contracted. The evidence at trial, 
7 
in particular the 44 photographs introduced and the expert testimony of Russell 
Ross, clearly show unprofessional work and demonstrate the error in the trial 
court's ruling that Mr. Pack's damage claims were speculative. This evidence was 
unrebutted by the defendant. 
4. Allowing Ms. Lewis' testimony after the Cabinet Shoppe's violation of 
the exclusion rule clearly prejudiced Mr. Pack's case. 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE TRIAL COURT'S FINDING THAT THE CABINET 
SHOPPE'S CONTRACT SUPERSEDED MR. PACK'S 
CONTRACT IS NOT BASED ON SUBSTANTIAL 
COMPETENT EVIDENCE PRODUCED AT TRIAL. 
There were two separate documents which the parties executed and signed prior 
to any work being done on the Pack house. The first document was prepared by 
Mr. Pack and presented to the Cabinet Shoppe. Both parties signed Mr. Pack's 
contract. (PL Exh. 1; Tr. 16, 166) The second document was a preprinted 
standard form prepared by the Cabinet Shoppe and presented to Mr. Pack. Both 
parties signed the Cabinet Shoppe's contract. (PI. Exh. 3, Tr. 16, 166) The intent 
to create one contract from dual documents was testified to by both parties and the 
court specifically found the facts supported this intent. (Finding of Fact 1 1, 2) 
See. Sacramento Baseball v. Gr. N. Baseball. 748 P.2d 1058 (Utah 1987). 
8 
Mr. Pack, before he signed the Cabinet Shoppe's contract marked clearly 
beside the paragraphs numbered 5 and 8 and a portion on the bottom of the Cabinet 
Shoppe's contract the words "takes exception". The only evidence produced at trial 
regarding the intent of the parties regarding Mr. Pack's rejection of those 
paragraphs is Mr. Pack's explanation. (Tr. 75) When asked what he meant by 
writing "takes exception", Mr. Pack answered "We will not comply with it. Its a — 
it's a term that's commonly used in my industry when reviewing specifications that 
we will not provide per that item or comply with that item." (Tr. 75) The Cabinet 
Shoppe gave no testimony regarding their understanding of the words "takes 
exception" or their contending meaning. 
Ms. Lewis affirmed that she understood that both Mr. Pack's contract and the 
Cabinet Shoppe contract made up the entire document. (Tr. 166) An appellate 
court is not bound by a trial court's construction of a written instrument where 
there has been no conflict in the extrinsic evidence received at trial. Integrated. 
Inc. v. Alec Fergusson Electrical Contractors. 250 Cal. App. 2d 287, 293; 58 Cal. 
Rptr. 503, 507 (1967). Furthermore Mr. Pack's letter (PI. Exh. 7) to the Cabinet 
Shoppe, mailed on June 28, 1988, explained in detail Mr. Pack's intention in 
marking "takes exception" on paragraphs 5 and 8. Ms. Lewis acknowledged the 
receipt of such letter, (Tr. 162) but failed to respond to Mr. Pack's rejection. 
There is nothing esoteric or hidden about "takes exception". Words and phrases of 
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a contract will be accorded their commonly accepted meaning whenever possible. 
Gordon v. CRS Consulting Engineers, Inc., 820 P.2d 492, 494 (Utah App. 1991) 
Both parties agreed they intended the two documents as their contract and no 
evidence was presented to the contrary. Furthermore, if preprinted provisions are 
inconsistent with handwritten provisions, the handwritten provisions prevail over 
preprinted portions. Integrated, 250 Cal. App. at 294, Cal. Rptr. at 508. The 
court's finding of fact paragraph 3, that the Cabinet Shoppe's contract applies in its 
entirety is, in fact, a legal conclusion. There must be evidence produced at trial to 
support a finding that justifies any legal conclusion. 50 W. Broadway Associates v. 
Redevelopment Agency, 784 P.2d 1162 (Utah 1989). None was produced here. 
Defendant also argues an alleged conflict in the two-document contract which 
was not raised as an issue in Appellant's Brief. Mr. Pack's document calls for 
payment in full "within 30 days after completion and inspection by E.L. Pack" (PI. 
Exh. 1), and the Cabinet Shoppe's document calls for payment "upon pick 
up/deliver" and provides any claim for adjustment shall not be reason or cause for 
failure to make payment from or under this contract. . ." (PL Exh. 3). This was 
never argued to the trial court. 
The court never addressed any such conflict in its findings of fact. Although 
the court finds there "are conflicts between the contracts which the court must 
decide", it never specifically addresses what those "conflicts" were and makes no 
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reference to payment provisions. (Finding of Fact 2) The failure of the trial court 
to make any finding on this material issue alone should be considered reversible 
error. Acton v. Deliran. 737 P.2d 996, 999 (Utah 1987) 
Paragraph 10 of the Cabinet Shoppe document states, in part: 
The Seller agrees that it will perform this contract in conformity with 
customary industry practices. The Purchaser agrees that any claim for 
adjustment shall not be reason or cause for failure to make payment arising 
from or under this contract . . . 
(PI. Exh. 3). To interpret the language of a contract, the Court of Appeals looks at 
a contract as a whole to determine parties' intent. Gordon, 820 P.2d at 294. The 
evidence presented at trial clearly demonstrated that the contract was not performed 
in "conformity with customary industry practices." 
The trial court's disregard of the agreed intent of the parties regarding the 
creation of their contract is clearly in error. The trial court's ruling regarding 
inclusion of the two documents in one contract is a question of law and this court 
will not defer to the trial court's legal conclusion, even though set forth as a 
"factual" determination. Buehner Block Co. v. UWC Assoc. 752 P.2d 892 (Utah 
1988) 
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II. THE FINDING THAT MR. PACK FAILED TO ALLOW 
THE CABINET SHOPPE TO REPAIR OR CORRECT THE 
CABINETS IS A GRIEVOUS MISINTERPRETATION OF 
THE EVIDENCE AND IS CLEARLY ERRONEOUS. 
The trial court's finding of fact, paragraph 6 states that the Cabinet Shoppe 
offered to make corrections to the cabinets as requested by Mr. Pack, but that Mr. 
Pack did not cooperate to permit this to happen. Although Appellee's Brief, claims 
that "evidence in the record supports this conclusion", the Cabinet Shoppe does not 
show any evidence that supports this determination but, instead, refers only to the 
irrelevant "extras" Appellee contends it provided. 
The testimony and exhibits clearly show cooperation by Mr. Pack and the 
unwillingness of the Cabinet Shoppe to perform the job they contracted to perform. 
Specifically, Mr. Pack agreed to pay for a set of cabinets of the highest quality 
to be constructed and installed in his home. The Cabinet Shoppe agreed to provide 
this product and service. (PI. Exh. 1) Mr. Pack also agreed in different words to 
pay the Cabinet Shoppe $8,500.00 to provide cabinets which conformed to 
customary industry practices. (PI. Exh. 3) 
At trial Mr. Pack and his expert, Mr. Russell Ross, testified to uncompleted, 
substandard cabinetry work and unsightly workmanship. This evidence is 
completely detailed throughout Appellant's Brief. See also the photographs of 
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Appellee's defects. (PL Exhs. 26-69). This evidence of defective workmanship 
remained unrebutted by defendant. 
Appellee cites general statements of contract law to support the finding that Mr. 
Pack failed to cooperate. While Contracts § 468(a), 17A Corpus Juris Secundum 
(1963) is accurately quoted, that argument simply begs the question because the 
evidence shows that Mr. Pack cooperated, and the Cabinet Shoppe simply never 
completed the job. (Tr. 29) 
The only arguable facts in the record supporting any noncooperation from Mr. 
Pack surround the November 2, 1988, incident. 
In early October, 1988, after commencement of the cabinetry work, Ms. Lewis 
sent Mr. Pack an invoice for $5,025.00, labelled "balance on the cabinetry". (Def. 
Exh. 5) On October 19, 1988, Mr. Pack returned the invoice to Ms. Lewis with 
an extensive detailed letter explaining the uncompleted work and requirements to 
finish the job. (PL Exh. 9) In this letter Mr. Pack complimented Mr. Sellers, on a 
good job so far, but expressed frustration that Mr. Sellers' failed to keep scheduled 
appointments. (PL Exh. 9) 
In response to the October 19, 1988, letter, Ms. Lewis, on behalf of the 
Cabinet Shoppe wrote to Mr. Pack and attempted to excuse the Cabinet Shoppe's 
failure to finish the job by listing the individual parts of the job that had been 
completed by the Cabinet Shoppe. Ms. Lewis also stated that Mr. Pack should 
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contact Mr. Sellers and make an appointment to meet at the home to complete 
several admitted deficient items. Ms. Lewis then finished the letter by demanding a 
cashiers check at that time for the total amount due. (Def. Exh. 6) 
Mr. Pack talked to Mr. Sellers after he received the above letter and again 
asked Mr. Sellers to come to the house and finish the items which were 
uncompleted. (Tr. 65, 176) Mr. Sellers said that he agreed to come to the house 
and take care of the problems. (Tr. 176) Mr. Pack, however, testified that he at 
no time agreed that he would provide a cashiers check for the balance due on the 
contract before the work was completed. At trial, Mr. Pack stated "the terms of 
payment are clearly specified in our contract" (Tr. 64-5) and that he intended to 
pay in full when the job was performed in "conformity with customary industry 
practices". 
Mr. Pack never told any Cabinet Shoppe employee that he would be at the 
home on November 2, 1988, to oversee the work and there was no evidence that he 
ever so agreed. (Tr. 66) Mr. Pack had advised the Cabinet Shoppe in writing as 
to the incomplete aspects of the job, and it was well aware of the work which 
needed completion. 
However, on November 2, 1988, Mr. Sellers and Gary Lewis showed up at the 
Pack home. When they discovered that Mr. Pack was not home, Mr. Lewis 
became violent and threatened Mr. Pack's elderly father with violence. Mr. Sellers 
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and Mr. Lewis left the home without completing any work. (Tr. 27, 176) Because 
of Mr. Lewis' violent outburst, Mr. Pack subsequently banned Mr. Lewis from his 
home. (PL Exh. 11, Tr. 28). 
After this incident, Mr. Pack continued to discuss the completion of the 
cabinets with Mr. Sellers. (PI. Exh. 12, 13; Tr. 29, 70-1, 176). In fact, Mr. 
Sellers returned to continue work on the Pack home (Tr. 176), but ultimately was 
unable to successfully complete the job. 
To interpret from this incident that Mr. Pack prevented the Cabinet Shoppe 
from performance is unreasonable and sanctions the use of violence and threats as a 
contract negotiation tool. Mr. Pack acted reasonably by prohibiting Mr. Lewis 
from returning to the Pack home because of Mr. Lewis' threats. 
The Cabinet Shoppe failed to provide cabinets of the "highest quality" and in 
conformity with customary industry standards", thereby forfeiting any claim to the 
full contract price. The finding that Mr. Pack failed to cooperate and provided the 
Cabinet Shoppe with "no reasonable opportunity under the circumstances to make 
the corrections requested", (Findings of Fact 7) is clearly erroneous and not based 
upon substantial competent evidence. 
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III. THE TRIAL COURT'S FINDING THAT MR. PACK 
FAILED TO PROVE THE ALLEGATIONS IN HIS 
COMPLAINT IS CLEARLY ERRONEOUS AND NOT 
BASED UPON SUBSTANTIAL COMPETENT EVIDENCE, 
Appellee claims Mr. Pack is a picky person because after 15 years of 
experience in cabinetry, Mr. Sellers could not satisfy Mr. Pack, even after 15 trips 
to the home. (Brief of Appellee, p. 7) The photographic evidence submitted at 
trial, shows clearly that Mr. Pack's dissatisfaction with the job was due to the 
incompetence of the Cabinet Shoppe work rather than some subjective standard of 
Mr. Pack's. The issue here is not the experience of the Cabinet Shoppe employees, 
but the workmanship, competence and compliance with specifications of the job 
performed by the Cabinet Shoppe. 
Appellee also maintains "there was not material deficiency in the cabinetry". 
(Id.) This was not a finding of the court, rather it is the opinion of the Cabinet 
Shoppe in disregard of undisputed evidence. The Cabinet Shoppe argues in its 
Brief that the record shows "extensive efforts, more than legally required to satisfy 
Mr. Pack" (Id- at 8), but gives no citations to the record, no case citations, and no 
evidence of what might be "legally required." The fact that Mr. Sellers made 
extensive trips to the Pack home is irrelevant to the state of the work performed, 
which is shown by the photographs. 
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The Cabinet Shoppe's conclusion that Mr. Pack "repeatedly manipulated the 
Cabinet Shoppe to satisfy his changing whims and increasing demands by 
withholding payment" is also completely unsupported. (Id.) 
Examples of Cabinet Shoppe cabinetry, "which would be a credit to any home" 
are set forth in Appendix A. 
Mr. Pack's expert, Russell Ross, testified in detail to the condition and 
appearance of the cabinetry work in the home. (Tr. 86-114) In his expert opinion 
defendant's poor workmanship on the cabinetry was visible throughout the entire 
home. (Tr. 115) This testimony was not refuted by any other evidence offered at 
trial. 
The Cabinet Shoppe again relies upon general contract authority to support their 
contention, but fails to cite even one case in support of this argument. Its reliance 
upon 17A Am. Jur. 2d Contracts Section 634, pp. 644-645 (1991), is 
inappropriate. Mr. Pack agrees with this general statement of contract law on page 
8 of Appellee's Brief regarding substantial compliance, however, said statement is 
not applicable to the issues raised in Appellant's Brief. 
The lists of defects set forth in Appellant's Brief on pages 9, 11-4, 26, 32-3, 
the photographs introduced as Plaintiffs Exhibits 26 through 69 and the in-depth 
testimony on the condition of the cabinets from Mr. Pack (Tr. 35-50) and from Mr. 
Ross (Tr. 86-114) contradicts substantial compliance. 
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The contract between the parties stated that the Cabinet Shoppe was to provide 
three specific detailed drawings of the cabinets. (PI. Exh. 1) The drawings 
referred to in Appellee's Brief are only the preliminary drawings, not even 
prepared by Ms. Lewis. (Brief of Appellee, p. 6) Ms. Lewis only made additional 
notes and pencil marks on the drawings, (Tr. 141) and failed at any time to provide 
more than one set of drawings. Had the Cabinet Shoppe completed the contracted 
for drawings with detailed dimensions as required , Mr. Pack would have had 
ample time to review and approve such drawings before the completion of certain 
cabinets. Thus, Mr. Pack is not at fault for objecting to certain cabinets upon 
delivery in that he was not able to review preliminary drawings of the cabinets as 
specifically set forth in the parties' contract. (PI. Exh. 1) 
The parties' contract called for the job to be completed in a workmanlike 
manner. To make repairs on a job that is not yet complete and to characterize 
those repairs as "warranty work" is neither consistent with the parties' contract 
terms nor industry practices. 
Mr. Pack submits that the court completely ignored the photographs, and other 
evidence presented at trial in arriving at the finding of fact number 8. The court 
will disturb the trial court's findings if those findings are determined to be clearly 
erroneous and are not based upon substantial competent evidence. In Re Estate of 
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BartelL 776 P.2d 213 (Utah App. 1990); Kimball v. Campbell, 699 P.2d 714 (Utah 
1985). 
IV. PERMITTING MS. LEWIS TO TESTIFY AFTER 
VIOLATING THE WITNESS EXCLUSION RULE 
EXECUTED BY DEFENDANT IS A CLEAR ERROR BY 
THE TRIAL COURT. 
The Cabinet Shoppe requested at the start of the trial, that all witnesses who 
were not directly involved or principals of the defendant company be excluded from 
the courtroom. (Tr. 5) The purpose of such rule is prevention of one witness 
hearing previous witnesses testimony and thereafter tailoring his or her testimony to 
best suit their perspective. Geders v. United States, 425 U.S. 80, 96 S.Ct. 1330 
(1975). 
If a witness exclusion rule is violated, the trial court should decide whether or 
not it would be prejudicial to the innocent party to permit the witness who heard the 
prior testimony to testify. If the court allows such testimony, it is a question of law 
and should be reviewed under a correctness standard. State v. Ramirez, 817 P.2d 
774 (Utah 1991) 
The testimony of Ms. Lewis was clearly prejudicial to Mr. Pack as it was 
directly influenced by and resulted in testimony from Ms. Lewis directly contrary 
to the testimony of Mr. Pack and Mr. Ross. 
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Examples of her testimony which specifically contradicted Mr. Pack's 
testimony are as follows: (1) Ms. Lewis stated she never received letters which 
detailed the parties' contract and were mailed by Mr. Pack to the Cabinet Shoppe 
(PI. Exh. 6 & 8; Tr. 149), (2) when shown the drawings provided to Mr. Pack 
lacked any elevations or dimensions, Ms. Lewis stated she never provides that 
information in her drawings (Tr. 164) even though an expert cabinet maker testified 
that it is customary industry practice to provide elevations for cabinets (Tr. 81), and 
(3) her testimony that Mr. Pack knew the quality of cabinets he was to receive 
because of his visit to the "Citations Home". (Tr. 160) 
The trial court abused its discretion in allowing Ms. Lewis, who remained in 
the courtroom, despite the ruling on the Cabinet Shoppe's motion to exclude 
witnesses, to testify. Ms. Lewis' testimony was influenced by what she heard and 
thus her testimony was prejudicial to Mr. Pack. We will never know how she 
would have testified if she had not heard the plaintiffs evidence before she took the 
stand. It is clear error that Ms. Lewis was allowed to stay in court despite the 
Cabinet Shoppe's motion and the Cabinet Shoppe should not be allowed to benefit 
from her enhanced testimony. This court should review this abuse under a 
correctness standard. 
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V. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN AWARDING THE 
CABINET SHOPPE ATTORNEY'S FEES. 
The argument set forth in Mr. Pack's brief is obviously misperceived by 
Appellee. Mr. Pack agrees that attorney's fees affidavits were admitted into 
evidence during the trial. (PI. Exh. 70, Def. Exh. 11) However, any award of 
attorney's fees must be supported by evidence in the record. Dixie State Bank v. 
Bracken. 764 P.2d 985 (Utah 1988), and as shown in Appellant's Brief, and above, 
the evidence presented clearly does not support the final decision of the trial court. 
Many of the court's findings of fact are not only against the clear weight of the 
evidence, but are legal conclusions, not factual findings at all. 
Appellee's Brief correctly states that both parties' attorney's fee affidavits 
itemize time spent and work performed, and identify the reasonableness of the fees 
charged, (pp. 14-5) The only argument Mr. Pack has with such award of 
attorney's fees to Appellee is that such award is not based upon the comprehensive 
evidence produced at trial. This award of attorney's fees is based upon a clear 
abuse of discretion by the trial court and should be reversed. 
CONCLUSION 
A trial court's findings must be based upon substantial competent evidence, and 
the findings given by the trial court in this case are anything but sufficient. 
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The parties intended to contract for the construction and installation of cabinets 
of the "highest standard of quality" for a price of $8,500.00. This agreement, set 
forth in two separate documents, comprised the parties' entire agreement. 
However, the trial court overlooked the parties' intention, and held that one 
document, the preprinted standard form of the Cabinet Shoppe, was the parties' 
sole document and total contract. This decision, as well as the court's many other 
findings, not in conformance with the evidence at trial, produced an unfair, unjust 
result. Mr. Pack is now burdened with substandard cabinets and a bill for 
uncompleted work. 
In accordance with the evidence produced at trial, the judgment against Mr. 
Pack should be reversed and the case remanded for findings in accordance with the 
evidence produced at trial, for Mr. Pack's damages as supported by the record, the 
release of the mechanic's lien, and Mr. Pack's attorney's fees. The Cabinet 
Shoppe's judgment should be entirely vacated. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this f day of June, 1993. 
HENRIOD, HENRIOD & NIELSEN 
/^r*&&— -P 
Stephen L. Henriod 
Clark R. Nielsen 
Sara Bendel Ryan 
Attorneys for Plaintiff/Appellant 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that I served the foregoing Appellant's Reply Brief by mailing 
2 copies thereof, postage prepaid to Appellee's counsel, L. Edward Robbins, Esq., 
310 S. Main, 12th Floor, Salt Lake City, Utah 84111, on the / day of June, 
1993. 
Stephen L. Henriod 
Clark R. Nielsen 
Sara Bendel Ryan 
Attorneys for Plaintiff/Appellant 
APPENDIX "A" 
i • *A tn cover bottom of cabinets. Poorly contrasting 
zv;:. s°i"r£ s tTdSxr^ . ^ „. .*« «, cover 
cabinets throughout the job. 
Plaintiff's Exhibit no. 32 
Microwave lacking trim kit. Cabinet undersized so trim kit will not fit. 
Plaintiff's Exhibit no. 28 
Scarred veneer, poor joint 
Plaintiff's Exhibit no. 62 
Peeling PVC tape, color contrast between woodwork and PVC tape, door too 
small to properly cover cabinet frame 
•«i __•_*.4-c-p'r, TTvVi-iMt no. 42 
1. im 
Splits and cracks in cabinets 
Plaintiff's Exhibit no. 29 
.*•. ^ -^^p-^piw"^**--—| 
vrnmm*-^^^ 
Color contrast between woodwork and PVC tape, Bulges in PVC tape 
Plaintiff's Exhibit no. 40 
1 I 
Obvious gouges and marks in woodwork 
Plaintiff's Exhibit no. 61 
Obvious gouges and marks in woodwork 
Plaintiff's Exhibit no. 49 
Oak kick plates never in-
stalled, requiring coving 
of linoleum, a change order 
to linoleum contractor. 
Plaintiffs Exhibit no. 53 
Misalignment of drawers 
Plaintiff's Exhibit no. 63 
•£. t 
tmimmmmommm 
>% • % • * ^.-r^bftr^m^MtvfJmmi^m'mi-
I 
Cabinet mounted flush with ceiling which should have been mounted 
on wall approximately 36 inches lower, cabinet partially covers 
ceiling fixture outlet making out let useless except to remain an 
eyesore* 
Plaintiff's Exhibit no. 69 
Misalignment of cabinet doors 
Plaintiff's Exhibit no. 64 
Misaligned/poor fitting doors 
Plaintiff's Exhibit no.26 
